省人民政府办公厅关于印发《湖北省以工代赈管理办法》的通知

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广东省深圳市人民政府


深圳市人民政府关于印发《深圳市海洋功能区划》的通知

（2004年9月24日）

深府〔2004〕158号

　　《深圳市海洋功能区划》已经市政府三届七十二次常务会议审议通过，并经省人民政府同意，现予印发，请遵照执行。



深圳市海洋功能区划

第一章 总 则

　　第一条 为科学、合理地开发利用海洋资源，提高海域使用效率，改善海洋环境质量，根据《中华人民共和国海洋环境保护法》、《中华人民共和国海域使用管理法》和国家有关规定，制定本区划。
　　第二条 本市范围内海洋功能划分和管理，适用本区划。
　　本市范围内的海洋包括本市陆地海岸线向海一侧的全部管辖海域。具体范围为：东部北起与惠州交界的白沙湾，向南到沙头角办事处的管辖海域；西部北起与东莞交界的东宝河口民主村，向南到深圳河口的管辖海域，以及管辖海岛的周围海域。
　　第三条 本市海洋功能区划按以下原则进行：
　　（一）按照海域的区位、自然资源和自然条件等自然属性，科学确定海域功能；
　　（二）根据经济和社会的发展需要，统筹安排各涉海行业用海；
　　（三）保障国防安全和海上交通安全，保证军事用海需要；
　　（四）注重资源效益、经济效益、社会效益和生态效益的统一。
　　第四条 市海洋局是全市海洋功能区划编制、调整、管理的行政主管部门，依照国家法律、法规规定和本区划履行有关海洋功能区划及管理职责。
　　市规划、建设、交通、旅游、环境保护、农业等主管部门在各自职责范围内，依法协助市海洋局履行海洋功能区划及管理职责。

第二章 2005年至2010年区划目标

　　第五条 逐步调整不符合功能区划的用海项目，实现海域开发利用符合海洋功能区划。
　　第六条 基本满足全市规划中各涉海行业计划用海的需求，划定海洋功能区134个，用海总面积50487.0ha。
　　第七条 近岸海域水质分别达到国家第四类——第三类海水水质标准。近岸海域以外水质达到国家第二类——第一类海水水质标准。其中深圳湾达到第二类海水水质标准，大鹏湾、大亚湾达到第一类海水水质标准。
　　工业废水必须治理达标后排放入海。排入海域的城镇生活污水处理率，2010年前特区达到90%，全市为80%。
　　第八条 重点治理和监控白沙湾、大鹏澳、南澳渔港、盐田港区、沙头角海域、深圳湾、妈湾港区、东宝河口等海域环境质量。

第三章 海洋功能分区

　　第九条 根据国家《市、县级海洋功能区划成果要求（试行）》的海洋功能区划分类体系，我市海洋功能区划分为港口航运区、渔业资源利用和养护区、旅游区、海水资源利用区、工程用海区、海洋保护区、特殊利用区和保留区等8个一级类、22个二级类，全市共划出134个海洋功能区，用海总面积50487.0ha（见附图3—1深圳市海洋功能区划示意图）。
　　第十条 港口航运区划定30个功能区，用海面积共24728.2ha，占用海总面积的48.98%。具体划分如下：
　　（一）港口区9个，包括盐田港区、蛇口——大铲湾港区、蛇口东角头港区、秤头角港口和电厂用海区、下洞——沙鱼涌港区、宝安工业港区、大亚湾核电站专用港区、大铲海关港区和机场油码头区，用海面积共8902.2ha；
　　（二）航道4条，包括深圳港的西部航道、下洞航道、三门航道、核电站航道，用海面积共4515.5ha；
　　（三）锚地区17个，包括西部液货锚地、西部货船锚地、西部小型船锚地、东角头油轮锚地、黄田1号——3号锚地③、大屿山1号——2号锚地②、孖洲西锚地、大铲锚地、东部2号——5号锚地④、大亚湾1号——2号锚地②，用海面积共11310.5ha。
　　第十一条 渔业资源利用和养护区划定24个功能区，用海面积共7663.8ha，占用海总面积的15.18%。具体划分如下：
　　（一）渔港7个，包括宝安、蛇口、盐田、南澳、坝光、东山、沙鱼涌等渔港，用海面积共205.9ha；
　　（二）养殖区8个，包括沙井、内伶仃岛北湾和东湾、内伶仃岛南湾、南澳、鹅公湾、岭澳、螺汗角、东山等养殖区，用海面积共1561.1ha；
　　（三）增殖区4个，包括矾石、大鹏半岛西南、大鹏半岛东部、虎头门等增殖区，用海面积共5052.7ha；
　　（四）人工鱼礁区4个，包括东冲——西冲、鹅公湾、背仔角、杨梅坑等人工鱼礁区，以及建设人工鱼礁管理中心用海区，用海面积共844.1ha。
　　第十二条 旅游区划定18个功能区，用海面积共2011.5ha，占用海总面积的3.98%。具体划分如下：
　　（一）风景旅游区6个，包括前海城市景观旅游区、海上世界旅游用海区、滨海大道城市景观旅游区、宝安海上田园风光旅游区、明斯克航母世界用海区、沙头角城市景观旅游区，用海面积共888.7ha；
　　（二）度假旅游区9个，包括溪涌、迭福、下沙、南澳、西冲、东冲、桔钓沙、大梅沙——小梅沙、大鹏金海湾等度假旅游区，用海面积共1008.4ha；
　　（三）游艇停泊区3个，包括蛇口、大梅沙、桔钓沙等游艇停泊区，用海面积共114.4ha。
　　第十三条 海水资源利用区划定5个功能区，即大亚湾核电取水区、岭澳核电站取水区、大铲电厂取水区、妈湾电厂取水区、东部电厂取水区，用海面积共34.5ha。
　　第十四条 工程用海区划定26个功能区，用海面积共4120.2ha，占用海总面积的8.16%。具体划分如下：
　　（一）海底管线3条，包括妈湾海底排污管线区、深港海底电缆管线区、大铲——妈湾海底管线区，用海面积共157.1ha；
　　（二）围海造地区16个，包括沙井、宝安、机场、前海、新安、妈湾北、妈湾南、妈湾中、大铲湾、大铲电厂、孖洲港区、后海、盐田东、盐田中、盐田圩镇、盐田西等填海区，用海面积共3465.1ha；
　　（三）海岸防护工程区2个，包括机场、福永——沙井防风暴潮区，用海面积共90.3ha；
　　（四）跨海桥梁区1个，包括西部通道跨海大桥，用海面积10.3ha；
　　（五）生物护岸工程区3个，包括沙井红树林区、福永红树林区、西乡红树林区，用海面积共293.3ha；
　　（六）其它工程用海区1个，包括西部通道建设区，用海面积104.1ha。
　　第十五条 海洋保护区划定2个功能区，用海面积共1473.6ha，占用海总面积的2.92%。具体划分如下：
　　（一）海洋和海岸自然生态保护区1个，即福田红树林自然保护区，用海面积271.1ha。
　　（二）生物物种自然保护区1个，即内伶仃岛猕猴自然保护区用海，用海面积1202.5ha。
　　第十六条 特殊利用区划定11个功能区，用海面积共5805.2ha，占用海总面积的11.50%。具体划分如下：
　　（一）科学研究试验区2个，包括深圳东部海洋生物高新科技产业区、中科院大亚湾海洋生物综合实验室，用海面积共221.6ha（中科院实验室使用整个大亚湾，用海面积没计入）；
　　（二）排污区9个，包括东宝河口、西乡、妈湾、蛇口——赤湾、深圳河口、盐田——沙头角、乌坭涌、南澳、核电站等排污区，用海面积共5583.6ha。
　　第十七条 保留区划定18个功能区，包括福永海域、机场西海域、机场南海域、西乡海域、沙井海域、深圳湾、揹仔角海域、大澳——水头沙海域、吓缸沙海域、鹏城东海域、洋筹角海域、鹿咀海域、上洞海域、土洋角海域、官湖角海域、沙头海域、大鹏半岛南海域、白沙湾等保留区，用海面积共4650.0ha。
　　大鹏湾航道、西部港区引航和东部1号锚地、大鹏湾幼鱼保护区、伶仃洋经济鱼类繁育场保护区、崖13——1管线区、深珠光缆管线区、珠江口中华白海豚自然保护区、大亚湾水产资源自然保护区等9个功能区因与邻近广州、惠州、中山、珠海等市管辖海域尚未确定，暂不确定具体用海面积。
　　内伶仃岛海岛周围海域的功能划入全市用海总面积。
　　第十八条 根据自然地理单元完整、优势资源突出、主导功能明确稳定的原则，将深圳市海域划分5个综合功能区：
　　（一）白沙湾——鹏城核电、保留综合功能区；
　　（二）大鹏——南澳旅游、渔业综合功能区；
　　（三）秤头角——沙头角港口、旅游综合功能区；
　　（四）深圳湾——大铲湾港口、保护综合功能区；
　　（五）坪洲——东宝河口工程、渔业综合功能区。

第四章 实施措施

　　第十九条 海域使用必须符合海洋功能区划。凡使用海域的，应当依照国家规定经过海域使用论证和海洋工程环境影响评估，并严格管理填海、围海等改变海域自然属性的用海活动。
　　对于不符合海洋功能区划的用海项目，主管部门不得批准立项、审批和颁发海域使用权证书。
　　第二十条 养殖、盐业、交通、旅游等行业规划涉及海域使用的，应当符合海洋功能区划。
　　沿海土地利用总体规划、城市规划、港口规划等涉及海域使用的，应当与海洋功能区划相衔接。
　　第二十一条 海洋行政主管部门审核海域使用申请时，应当征求同级有关部门的意见。
　　颁发海域使用权证书，应向社会公告。
　　第二十二条 海域使用者发现所使用海域有异常，应及时报告海洋行政主管部门。
　　第二十三条 海洋环境保护主管部门应当采取下列措施，保护海域环境：
　　（一）整治深圳湾和沙头角海域，确保海水水质在2010年前达到第三类海水水质标准；
　　（二）实行陆源污染物入海总量控制制度；
　　（三）督促实施船舶油污水集中处理；
　　（四）严格控制海水养殖规模，确保不超过海域养殖容量；
　　（五）根据珠江口综合整治规划的要求，开展本市海域专项整治。
　　第二十四条 海洋主管部门应当加大对海洋功能区划执行情况的监督检查力度，严格执法，坚决取缔不符合海洋功能区划的用海活动。
　　海洋环境主管部门应当加强对海洋生态环境检测，对造成破坏的，应当限期进行整治和恢复。
　　第二十五条 海洋主管部门负责依法发布海洋功能区划公报，加强宣传教育，动员全社会的力量，加强舆论监督，完善信访、举报和听证制度，共同监督实施本区划。
　　第二十六条 海洋主管部门应当完善海洋功能区划管理信息系统，为实行海域动态管理提供技术支持。
　　第二十七条 海洋主管部门应完善海域生态系统的监视、监测、预报、预警、应急系统，定期发布海域环境质量公报。

第五章 附 则

　　第二十八条 以下附件与本区划具有同等效力：
　　（一）深圳市海洋功能区登记表；
　　（二）深圳市海岸线示意图；
　　（三）深圳市海洋功能区划示意图。
　　第二十九条 我市海洋功能区划的修改，由原编制机关会同同级有关部门提出修改方案，报原批准机关批准。
　　第三十条 本区划自2004年10月1日起实施。
　　
　　

深圳市海洋功能区登记表　　



　 一

级类
二级类
范围
地理座标
面积

（ ha）
使用现状
管理要求
备注

东经
北纬

1

港

口

航

运

区
1.1 港

口

区
1.1.1
宝安工业港区
北起福永镇的四兴涌，南至虾山涌的西海堤外侧海域
东至 113 ° 46 ′ 24 ″

西至 113 ° 45 ′ 38 ″
南至 22 ° 40 ′ 02 ″

北至 22 ° 41 ′ 03 ″
87.4
西海堤外侧部分鱼塭养殖
控制港区围填海范围；三类海水标准。


1.1.2
深圳国际机场油码头区
新围外侧向海延伸 1.6km
东至 113 ° 48 ′ 25 ″

西至 113 ° 47 ′ 56 ″
南至 22 ° 36 ′ 22 ″

北至 22 ° 36 ′ 43 ″
25.9
已建成栈桥式码头
码头左右两侧各 100m 为用海区，防止漏油污染；三类海水标准。


1.1.3
蛇口至大铲湾港区
位于蛇口到大铲湾之间海域
东至 113 ° 55 ′ 24 ″

西至 113 ° 47 ′ 31 ″
南至 22 ° 25 ′ 44 ″

北至 22 ° 34 ′ 21 ″
7264.5
大部分现为港区
东角头下—南头关界港池内执行四类海水标准，东角头下—南头关界港池外执行三类海水标准。


1.1.4
大铲海关港区
位于大铲岛北部海域
113 ° 50 ′ 29 ″
22 ° 31 ′ 04 ″
12.3
现为港区
加强管理，防止码头区污染，严控围填海。


1.1.5
蛇口东角头港区
包括客运码头、

东角头货运码头
东至 113 ° 57 ′ 03 ″

西至 113 ° 55 ′ 49 ″
南至 22 ° 28 ′ 03 ″

北至 22 ° 29 ′ 07 ″
226.6
现为港区
东角头下—南头关界港池内执行四类海水标准，东角头下—南头关界港池外执行三类海水标准。


1.1.6
盐田港区
位于沙头角保税区至正角嘴海域
东至 114 ° 18 ′ 30 ″

西至 114 ° 14 ′ 16 ″
南至 22 ° 33 ′ 10 ″

北至 22 ° 35 ′ 18 ″
809.2
部分现为港区
邻接深圳市主要海滨旅游区和 海水养殖区，必须严格控制港口污染物的倾倒和排放，确保达到三类海水标准。


1.1.7
下洞至沙鱼涌港区
位于大鹏湾北部海域
东至 114 ° 24 ′ 11 ″

西至 114 ° 22 ′ 29 ″
南至 22 ° 35 ′ 50 ″

北至 22 ° 36 ′ 54 ″
355.1
大部分现为港区
属危险品码头，防止漏油污染海洋；达到三类海水标准。
栈桥式码头

1.1.8
秤头角港口、电厂用海区
位于大鹏湾东岸秤头角附近海域
东至 114 ° 26 ′ 17 ″

西至 114 ° 25 ′ 52 ″
南至 22 ° 34 ′ 01 ″

北至 22 ° 34 ′ 48 ″
88.6
正在规划建设
天然气登陆码头，加强管理，防止漏油、爆炸、失火和港区污染，切实加强安全防卫工作保证相邻滨海旅游区的安全；达到三类海水标准。


1.1.9
大亚湾核电站专用港区
位于大亚湾内大鹏澳北岸海域
东至 114 ° 32 ′ 44 ″

西至 114 ° 32 ′ 23 ″
南至 22 ° 35 ′ 16 ″

北至 22 ° 35 ′ 38 ″
32.6
现为港区
核电站建设专用港；达到四类海水标准。


一

级类
二级类
范围
地理座标
面积

（ ha）
使用现状
管理要求
备注

东经
北纬

1

港

口

航

运

区
1.2

航

道

区
1.2.1
深圳港西部航道
位于伶仃洋东槽南段至铜鼓水道


2595.3
部分现为航道
航道浚深物按规定倾倒。
包括蛇口航道、赤湾航道、大 铲水道、矾石水道、公沙水道。

1.2.2
下洞港区航道
南起平洲西面 1.7 海里处，北至下洞码头南面


345.9
现为航道
不兼他用，保持航道顺畅。


1.2.3
三门航道
从大鹏角至海柴湾


813.1
现为航道
保持航道顺畅


1.2.4
核电站航道
从海柴湾至核电站港区


761.2
现为航道
按核电站要求使用。


1.3 锚

地

区
1.3.1
液货船待泊锚地
位于孖洲南面，妈湾港区对开海域
113 ° 50 ′ 40 ″

113 ° 50 ′ 40 ″

113 ° 51 ′ 40 ″

113 ° 51 ′ 26 ″
22 ° 29 ′ 22 ″

22 ° 28 ′ 24 ″

22 ° 28 ′ 24 ″

22 ° 29 ′ 22 ″
309.3
现为锚地
保持锚地正常使用。


1.3.2
货船待泊锚地
位于赤湾港区对开海域
113 ° 50 ′ 40 ″

113 ° 50 ′ 40 ″

113 ° 52 ′ 38 ″

113 ° 52 ′ 38 ″

113 ° 51 ′ 55 ″
22 ° 28 ′ 24 ″

22 ° 26 ′ 24 ″

22 ° 26 ′ 24 ″

22 ° 27 ′ 00 ″

22 ° 28 ′ 24 ″
1085.8
现为锚地
保持锚地正常使用。


1.3.3
小型船舶待泊锚地
位于深圳湾内，蛇口港区对开海域
113 ° 54 ′ 00 ″

113 ° 56 ′ 00 ″

113 ° 56 ′ 00 ″

113 ° 54 ′ 00 ″
22 ° 26 ′ 47 ″

22 ° 27 ′ 53 ″

22 ° 28 ′ 34 ″

22 ° 27 ′ 28 ″
433.8
现为锚地
控制深圳湾填海以保持和稳定锚地水深， 保持锚地正常使用 。


1.3.4
东角头油轮待泊、检疫锚地
位于蛇口油库码头对开海域
113 ° 56 ′ 01 ″

113 ° 56 ′ 50 ″

113 ° 56 ′ 59 ″

113 ° 56 ′ 14 ″
22 ° 27 ′ 55 ″

22 ° 28 ′ 22 ″

22 ° 28 ′ 46 ″

22 ° 28 ′ 28 ″
98.3
现为锚地
随着港口功能改变，改为其他船舶的锚地，保持锚地正常使用。


1.3.5
黄田 1 号锚地
位于细丫岛北面
113 ° 49 ′ 20 ″

113 ° 48 ′ 43 ″

113 ° 48 ′ 43 ″

113 ° 49 ′ 20 ″
22 ° 33 ′ 19 ″

22 ° 33 ′ 19 ″

22 ° 34 ′ 00 ″

22 ° 34 ′ 00 ″
133.7
现为锚地
属浅滩淤积区，只适宜 3000 吨以下船舶停泊。


　 一

级类
二级类
范 围
地理座标
面积

（ ha）
使用现状
管理要求
备注

东经
北纬

1

港

口

航

运

区
1.3 锚

地

区
1.3.6
黄田 2 号锚地
位于福永港区对开海域
113 ° 46 ′ 36 ″

113 ° 46 ′ 06 ″

113 ° 46 ′ 32 ″

113 ° 47 ′ 01 ″

不分页显示　　　总共10页　　1 [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]

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Chapter V
Guidelines for Interpretation
of the WTO Covered Agreements


OUTLINE

I Introduction
II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
IV The Status of Legitimate Expectations in Interpretation



I Introduction
According to Art. 11 of the DSU, the panel's role is to “make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. In the previous chapter, we have examined the general standard of review labeled as “an objective assessment” regarding “the facts of the case”; clearly, for panels to fulfil appropriately their functions as designated in Art. 11 of the DSU, it is also indiscerptible to make such an objective assessment of “the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. Therefore, the interpretation issue of the covered agreements arises. In this section, the author will scrutinize guidelines for interpretation applied under the WTO jurisprudence.
To resolve a particular dispute, before addressing the parties' arguments in detail, it is clearly necessary and appropriate to clarify the general issues concerning the interpretation of the relevant provisions and their application to the parties' claims. However, the complex nature of the covered agreements has given rise to difficulties in interpretation.
As noted previously, GATT/WTO jurisprudence should not be viewed in isolation from general principles developed in international law or most jurisdictions; and according to Art. 3.2 of the DSU, panels are bound by the “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” in their examination of the covered agreements. A number of recent adopted reports have repeatedly referred, as interpretative guidelines, to “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” as embodied in the text of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘Vienna Convention’), especially in its Arts. 31, 32. It is in accordance with these rules of treaty interpretation that panels or the Appellate Body have frequently examined the WTO provisions at issue, on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the terms of those provisions in their context, in the light of the object and purpose of the covered agreements and the WTO Agreement. These Vienna Convention articles provide as follows:

“Art. 31: General Rule of Interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.

Art. 32 Supplementary Means of Interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”

II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
Pursuant to Art. 31.1 of the Vienna Convention, the duty of a treaty interpreter is to determine the meaning of a term in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the term in its context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. As noted by the Appellate Body in its Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages (DS8/DS10/DS11), “Article 31 of provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: ‘interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty’. The provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions”. And in US ? Shrimps (DS58), the Appellate Body accordingly states: “A treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular provision to be interpreted. It is in the words constituting that provision, read in their context, that the object and purpose of the states parties to the treaty must first be sought. Where the meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or where confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the text itself is desired, light from the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may usefully be sought.”
More specifically, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules that: “Text, context and object-and-purpose correspond to well established textual, systemic and teleological methodologies of treaty interpretation, all of which typically come into play when interpreting complex provisions in multilateral treaties. For pragmatic reasons the normal usage, and we will follow this usage, is to start the interpretation from the ordinary meaning of the ‘raw’ text of the relevant treaty provisions and then seek to construe it in its context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose. However, the elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object-and-purpose as well as good faith - are to be viewed as one holistic rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Context and object-and-purpose may often appear simply to confirm an interpretation seemingly derived from the ‘raw’ text. In reality it is always some context, even if unstated, that determines which meaning is to be taken as ‘ordinary’ and frequently it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at object-and-purpose. As noted by the Appellate Body: ‘Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: 'interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty'’. It adds, however, that ‘[t]he provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions’.” 1
In sum, as noted by the Panel in Canada-Automotive Industry (DS139/DS142), “understanding of these rules of interpretation is that, even though the text of a term is the starting-point for any interpretation, the meaning of a term cannot be found exclusively in that text; in seeking the meaning of a term, we also have to take account of its context and to consider the text of the term in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention explicitly refers to the ‘ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their [the terms'] context and in the light of its [the treaty's] object and purpose’. The three elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object and purpose - are to be viewed as one integrated rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Of course, context and object and purpose may simply confirm the textual meaning of a term. In many cases, however, it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at the context and/or object and purpose”. 2
With regard to Art. 32 of the Vienna Convention, it is repeatedly ruled that, “[t]he application of these rules in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention will usually allow a treaty interpreter to establish the meaning of a term. However, if after applying Article 31 the meaning of the term remains ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, Article 32 allows a treaty interpreter to have recourse to ‘... supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion’. With regard to 'the circumstances of [the] conclusion' of a treaty, this permits, in appropriate cases, the examination of the historical background against which the treaty was negotiated.” 3
As a whole, under the WTO jurisprudence, with regard to the dispute among the parties over the appropriate legal analysis to be applied, as general principles or guidelines of interpretation, it is often begun with Art. 3.2 of the DSU. To go further, as noted by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, “the ‘customary rules of interpretation of public international law’ are those incorporated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). GATT panels have previously interpreted the GATT in accordance with the VCLT. The Panel noted that Article 3:2 DSU in fact codifies this previously-established practice”. Consequently, “the Panel concluded that the starting point of an interpretation of an international treaty, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in accordance with Article 31 VCLT, is the wording of the treaty. The wording should be interpreted in its context and in the light of the object and the purpose of the treaty as a whole and subsequent practice and agreements should be taken into account. Recourse to supplementary means of interpretation should be made exceptionally only under the conditions specified in Article 32 VCLT”. 4
In short, it is may be the case that, it is generally considered that the fundamental rules of treaty interpretation set out in Arts. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention have attained the status of rules of customary international law. In recent years, the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body and WTO panels has become one of the richest sources from which to receive guidance on their application.
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
The Panel Report on Turkey-Textile and Clothing Products (DS34) states concerning the conflicts issue that: 5
“As a general principle, WTO obligations are cumulative and Members must comply with all of them at all times unless there is a formal ‘conflict’ between them. This flows from the fact that the WTO Agreement is a ‘Single Undertaking’. On the definition of conflict, it should be noted that: ‘… a conflict of law-making treaties arises only where simultaneous compliance with the obligations of different instruments is impossible. ... There is no conflict if the obligations of one instrument are stricter than, but not incompatible with, those of another, or if it is possible to comply with the obligations of one instrument by refraining from exercising a privilege or discretion accorded by another’.
This principle, also referred to by Japan in its third party submission, is in conformity with the public international law presumption against conflicts which was applied by the Appellate Body in Canada - Periodicals and in EC - Bananas III, when dealing with potential overlapping coverage of GATT 1994 and GATS, and by the panel in Indonesia - Autos, in respect of the provisions of Article III of GATT, the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement. In Guatemala - Cement, the Appellate Body when discussing the possibility of conflicts between the provisions of the Anti-dumping Agreement and the DSU, stated: ‘A special or additional provision should only be found to prevail over a provision of the DSU in a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to a violation of the other provision, that is, in the case of a conflict between them’.
We recall the Panel's finding in Indonesia - Autos, a dispute where Indonesia was arguing that the measures under examination were subsidies and therefore the SCM Agreement being lex specialis, was the only ‘applicable law’ (to the exclusion of other WTO provisions): ‘14.28 In considering Indonesia's defence that there is a general conflict between the provisions of the SCM Agreement and those of Article III of GATT, and consequently that the SCM Agreement is the only applicable law, we recall first that in public international law there is a presumption against conflict. This presumption is especially relevant in the WTO context since all WTO agreements, including GATT 1994 which was modified by Understandings when judged necessary, were negotiated at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum. In this context we recall the principle of effective interpretation pursuant to which all provisions of a treaty (and in the WTO system all agreements) must be given meaning, using the ordinary meaning of words.’
In light of this general principle, we will consider whether Article XXIV authorizes measures which Articles XI and XIII of GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC otherwise prohibit. In view of the presumption against conflicts, as recognized by panels and the Appellate Body, we bear in mind that to the extent possible, any interpretation of these provisions that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided.”
It is clearly implied by the ruling above that, in the WTO system, any interpretation of the covered agreements that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided. In this respect, as to WTO rules of conflicts, in the context that all WTO agreements were negotiated “at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum”, the principle of effective interpretation is recalled. What a principle is it?
As ruled by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverage (DS8/DS10/DS11), effective interpretation is a principle “whereby all provisions of a treaty must be, to the extent possible, given their full meaning so that parties to such a treaty can enforce their rights and obligations effectively…. this principle of interpretation prevents [the panel] from reaching a conclusion on the claims … or the defense …, or on the related provisions invoked by the parties, that would lead to a denial of either party's rights or obligations.” 6 This ruling is upheld by the Appellate Body when ruling that, “[a] fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation flowing from the general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 is the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat). In United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, we noted that ‘[o]ne of the corollaries of the ‘general rule of interpretation’ in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility’.” 7